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Abstract
This paper examines the causes behind the flattening of the Japanese Phillips curve by analyzing
the unemployment rate measure, and its role in the flattening of the curve. This paper will utilize
the actual Japanese unemployment rates from 2002 through 2019, as well as estimate an
alternative unemployment rates that takes into consideration discouraged workers. In my study, I
recreate the Phillips curve using these two measures of unemployment, as well as implement a
simple OLS regression to understand the slopes of each Phillips curves. I will also utilize the
Weintraub equation in order to theorize factors that may be leading to the flattening of the curve.
I hypothesize that the Phillips curve still maintains the correct relationship, but there is an issue
behind how we measure unemployment. However, my results conclude that Japan’s Phillips
curve flattened more when utilizing the alternative unemployment rate rather than the actual
unemployment rate. Furthermore, when applying a quadratic fit to the Phillips curve, it is evident
that the recent Japanese Phillips curve has a concave relationship rather than displaying the
traditional convex curve. I theorize that changes in the female labor force population within
Japan is responsible for a decrease in the discouraged worker effect, thus causing a greater
flattening of the curve.
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1 Introduction
Economists have long debated the validity of the Phillips curve, a structural model of the
inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation. In recent years, it seems that the
Phillips curve, especially those in industrial nations, are either flattening out, or are declared
dead. Japan is no stranger to this phenomenon. Recently, the country’s economy has been
experiencing high levels of output, coupled with productivity growth and low levels of
unemployment. Despite this, wage growth is stagnant, and inflation remains close to zero even in
the face of several inflation-stimulating policies from the Bank of Japan. I will examine the
flattening of the Phillips curve in Japan by analyzing one of the inputs—unemployment rate. If
one of the input variables is not properly measured, the relationship between unemployment and
inflation can be impacted. This topic is extremely pertinent to monetary and fiscal policy makers,
because they heavily base their policy decisions on the relationship between inflation and
unemployment that is highlighted by the Phillips curve.
In Section 2 I give a brief overview on the history of the Phillips curve and some of the
theories surrounding the flattening of the curve. I first examine the theories behind the creation
of the Phillips curve by examining Phillips (1958). As there are several theories surrounding the
flattening of the Phillips curve, I cover some of the popular theories that have been mentioned in
the past. Some economists such as Iakova (2007) argue that the effects of globalization on price
and wage flexibility has caused the slope coefficient on the Phillips curve to decrease. However,
it is evident that globalization is not the only reason for the flattening. Previous studies such as
Belz, Wessel, & Yellen (2020) discussed the increased stabilization in inflation prediction, and
therefore the stabilization of rational expectations to have contributed to the phenomenon.
Structural changes within the economy and labor market could be yet another factor.
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Additionally, some economists such as Ball and Moffitt (2001) believe that the Phillips curve
equation does not capture such changes in the economy, and thus has some missing variables,
leading to the reshaping of the Phillips curve. Most of these studies focus on the Phillips curve
within the United States or the United Kingdom, but similar theories could apply to Japan
because it is also an industrialized nation. In this section I also review the studies that focus
solely on Japan’s Phillips curve. When looking specifically at Japan, Smith (2006) delineates
Japan’s Phillips curve using data from January 1980 to August 2005 in his paper “Japan’s
Phillips Curve Looks Like Japan. 1” Figure 1 below shows Japan’s Phillips curve during this time
period, and the same data with negative unemployment. When Japan’s Phillips curve is rotated
on its vertical axis, it resembles the islands of Japan 2.
Figure 1: Japan’s Phillips Curve Presented in Smith (2006)
Inflation and Unemployment Rates

Inflation Rate and (Minus) Unemployment Rate

(January 1980 to August 2005)

(January 1980 to August 2005)

Smith utilizes the datasets “Japan Consumer Price Index” and “Japanese Harmonized Unemployment Rate” found
on the Federal Reserve or St. Louis website.
2
Instruction on how to replicate Smith (2006) was published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis on the FRED
Blog in 2016. https://fredblog.stlouisfed.org/2016/04/replicating-the-japanese-beveridge-curve/
1
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However, when looking at more recent data, it is evident that Japan’s Phillips curve is indeed
flattening out. Specifically, many Japanese economists have looked at the 1990s bubble burst as
a catalyst for the flattening. Yamamoto (2008) summarizes that the bubble burst in the early
1990s resulted in downward nominal wage rigidity coupled with negative inflation rates as well
as an increase in the discouraged worker effect that resulted in a flatter Phillips curve.
Policy implications surrounding the Phillips curve impact various monetary and fiscal
policies because central bankers and policy makers rely on the delicate relationship between
unemployment and inflation. Specifically, in the case of Japan, understanding the country’s
Phillips curve becomes important given that the Bank of Japan has tried several inflationstimulating strategies to escape the chronic deflation that has lasted decades. Since the Phillips
curve is considered to be one of the foundational models used for forecasting as well as policy
advising within central banks, further understanding a country’s Phillips curve could directly
impact the economy.
In this paper, I aim to examine the impact of how unemployment rates are measured on
the flattening out of the Phillips curve. First, I use the Weintraub equation to analyze factors in
the Japanese economy that may lead to a flatter Phillips curve. I will then gather data on the
Japanese unemployment rate from 2002 through 2019, and also generate an alternative
unemployment rate that encompasses the discouraged worker rate. I will then create two separate
Phillips curves, and run an OLS regression to further analyze the slope coefficient. I hypothesize
that the unemployment measure, collected by the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications and presented by the Japan Statistics Bureau, does not capture actual
unemployment. Furthermore, I hypothesize that the flaw in the methodology of calculating one
of the variables of the Phillips curve could be a potential cause of the flattening. By utilizing a
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more comprehensive unemployment measure, I believe it is possible that the slope of the Phillips
curve will increase.
My paper contributes to the literature by examining the unemployment measure rather
than the inflation measure of the Phillips curve. Much of the analysis examines and discusses
how there are changes within the inflation aspect that is causing the Phillips curve to flatten.
Furthermore, I explore the possibility of a structural problem with how our economic measures
are being collected and calculated. If there proves to be a problem with how countries collect
various economic measures, there could be repercussions in other economic models as well.
However, my results show that by utilizing the alternative unemployment, the slope flattens even
more. In Section 5, I theorize how changes within the female labor market in Japan specifically
may lead to such a flattening out when encompassing discouraged workers.
In total, my paper is structured as followed: Section 2 outlines previous research related
to my topic through the literature review; Section 3 will give an overview of my data and my
methodological approach; Section 4 presents my results; Section 5 discusses my results and
some theory to back up my results as well as some limitations, and presents areas for future
research; and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
Several economists and researchers have discussed the flattening out of the Phillips
curve. Analyzing the relationship between inflation and unemployment, as well as understanding
whether the relationship still holds true today, is important for economists as well as lawmakers.
Monetary and fiscal policy are both contingent on this delicate balance of stable prices and high
employment. However, central banks around the world continue to use the Phillips curve to
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conduct inflation targeting as well as justify the implementation of monetary and fiscal policy
decisions. Economists seem puzzled because there seems to be no singular reason why the
Phillips curve—representing the trade-off between inflation and unemployment rate—is
flattening out in industrial nations in recent years. Japan’s economy is no exception to this, as the
Phillips curve shows significant flattening out following the economic bubble’s burst in the early
1990s.
2.1 Defining the Phillips Curve
The Phillips curve, originally developed by A.W. Phillips, defines the macroeconomic
relationship between inflation and unemployment. Phillips (1958) defines the inverse
relationship between wage inflation rate and unemployment. He builds his hypothesis on the
theory that if the unemployment rate is high and labor markets are loose, it could be expected
that there would be downward pressure on wages rising since labor supply is greater than labor
demand. Therefore, it would imply that there is no reason for firms, ceteris paribus, to raise
prices. The opposite is true if labor markets are tight—labor market demand is greater than
supply, meaning there is upward pressure on wages and firms are compelled to raise prices.
Phillips finds that empirical evidence in the United Kingdom from 1913 to 1957 supports his
hypothesis, and thus the short-run wage Phillips curve was solidified as a principal
macroeconomic model. Besides the wage Phillips curve, there is the short-run price Phillips
curve and the long-run Phillips curve. Although there are slight discrepancies between the shortrun wage Phillips curve and price Phillips curve, both the short run Phillips curves are showing
signs of flattening out (Yellen 2006). Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1968) claimed the long-run
Phillips curve is simply a vertical line at the point of the natural rate of unemployment. In the
long run, the inflation rate will also behave in relation to the natural rate of unemployment, rather
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than the current unemployment rate. Friedman further states that a current unemployment rate
that falls below the natural rate would see an increase in inflation, and unemployment that falls
above the natural rate would see an increase in deflation. New Classical economists such as
Lucas (1972) and Sargent (1973) have suggested that monetary policy can be used to stabilize
the natural rate of unemployment, and thus also control for long-term unemployment and
inflation rates. This close relationship between the natural rate of unemployment and inflation
has caused the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) to have a synonymous
relationship with the natural rate of unemployment. In recent years, the decrease in NAIRU as
well as the natural rate has caused shifts in the long-run Phillips curve as well. For the purpose of
this paper, I will be looking at the short-run Phillips curve in order to examine the trade-off
between inflation rates and unemployment.
2.2 The Death of the Phillips Curve
Today, several economists are observing the flattening out of the Phillips curve across
industrial nations. Some economists go as far as to claim that the Phillips curve is dead, and the
inverse relationship between unemployment rate and inflation no longer holds true. There are
several theories as to why the Phillips curve is flattening out. These theories can largely be
broken down into two categories: globalization and inflation predictions.
Iakova (2007) observes consistently low levels of inflation in the United Kingdom during
the 1990s that were not accompanied by high levels of unemployment. This sort of flattening out
of the Phillips curve’s slope is being observed in other industrial nations around the world.
Iakova argues that there are three ways globalization is causing such flattening out. First, an
increase in globalization creates an increase in competition. As competition increases, domestic
companies lose the power to increase prices, despite the fact that demand is rising. Therefore,
9

prices remain low. Second, as international trade and investment increase, price sensitivity of
goods decreases because of an increase in the supply and competition for products. Specifically,
price in industrial nations become less sensitive to domestic demand because of the increased
competition from other nations that often have cheaper labor or lower opportunity costs. Lastly,
globalization has also affected the human labor market by increasing mobility. Similar to how
trade and investment make prices of goods and services less sensitive to domestic demand, labor
mobility makes prices less sensitive in the service sector. Domestic workers’ ability to demand
for higher wages decreases because of the immediate threat that their jobs can be taken by
cheaper foreign labor. Therefore, despite the fact that domestic labor markets are tightening,
worker wages may remain low. Although Iakova successfully investigates the effect of
globalization on inflation rates, specifically in tight markets, she fails to address the other half of
the Phillips curve—unemployment. Foundationally, if labor markets are tight, labor market
demand is greater than supply, implying that there will be an upward pressure on wages and
firms may be compelled to raise prices. Furthermore, with cheaper foreign labor and lower
opportunity costs, jobs will be taken by such foreign labor, causing domestic unemployment to
rise. Although globalization could be a contributing factor to the flattening out of the Phillips
curve, it is difficult to imagine that it would be the only factor. Whether globalization has a large
enough effect on domestic inflation to distort the Phillips curve is questionable. Ball (2006) also
questions the extent to which globalization actually influences domestic inflation. He suggests
that globalization has ultimately not contributed to a great enough change in inflation behavior.
Therefore, he concludes that globalization has not had a great enough effect to result in a
structural change of the Phillips curve.
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Conflicting arguments are made in Yellen (2006). Her argument also supports the
globalization argument, because she states, “the first channel is the most obvious one—the direct
effect of the reductions in the prices of imported goods and services that may be caused by
globalization, and which are included in the indices of consumer prices that central banks
commonly target” (Yellen, 2006). This combined with the effect of lower import prices “reduce
workers’ demand for nominal wage increases” (Yellen, 2006). However, Yellen concludes that
ultimately globalization has had the greatest effect on the flattening of the Phillips curve because
firms have lost the ability to mark up and set prices due to an increase in globalization and
import prices.
Stabilization in inflation predictions is also considered to be a reason why the Phillips
curve is flattening. Belz, Wessel, and Yellen (2020) suggest that expected inflation is becoming
steadier and is responding less to changes in actual inflation. As expected inflation becomes
more anchored, wage and price settings are less influenced by inflation rates as the rational
expectation theory suggests. In the paper, Yellen in fact mentions the possibility that the
attenuation of the Phillips curve could be due to the unemployment rate not capturing the full
extent of labor market slack. In the United States, the prime age labor force participation level
has not recovered to pre-Great Recession levels. In addition, there is an increase in involuntary
part time workers and discouraged workers. Such data suggests that the civilian unemployment
rate is failing to capture a sector of the unemployed population. Furthermore, Yellen discusses
the possibility of downward nominal wage rigidity contributing to the flattening of the Phillips
curve. Specifically, during and following recession, wage inflation tends to be modest due to
wage cuts being levied on employees.
2.3 Unemployment and Japan’s Phillips Curve
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Historically, the Phillips curve in Japan displayed a relationship that was in line with
A.W. Phillips’ theory. In fact, prior to the 1990s, other industrial nations had started to observe
the flatter Phillips curve, while Japan’s Phillips curve remained steep. However, several
researchers have also suggested that the slope coefficient for the Phillips curve in Japan is getting
flatter, especially following the bubble burst in the early 1990s. Yamamoto (2008) analyzes
changes in labor market structures and operations following the burst of the bubble economy in
Japan in 1991. Yamamoto observes that the Phillips curve before the crash of the economy is
much steeper. Following the bubble burst, the Phillips curve seems to be much flatter—
mimicking other industrialized nations. There are several cultural economic practices within the
labor market that can be attributed to the steeper Phillips curve. Yamamoto lists some as:
“nominal wage flexibility reflecting flexible bonus payments or annual spring wage negotiations,
slow employment adjustment, and the large discouraged effects” (Yamamoto, 2008). On the
contrary, he concludes that the flatter Phillips curve is “attributable to the existence of downward
nominal wage rigidity under the low and negative inflation rate as well as a decline in
discouraged worker effects” (Yamamoto, 2008).
My study mimics parts of Yamamoto’s paper, but more recent data. Rather than the 1990s
bubble burst, with my data I will be taking into account the 2008 financial crisis. I will also have
to take into account the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake as an event that produced a negative economic
shock. My discouraged worker effect analysis will also build off of Yamamoto’s findings from
the 1990s but including modern changes in Japan’s female labor market. In his article,
Yamamoto fails to mention significant structural changes in the labor market following the
bubble burst in Japan, which I plan on observing. I will tie in modern Japanese marital and
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fertility rates to build on his theories regarding the impact of Japanese women on the discouraged
worker effect.
Furthermore, the discouraged worker effect that was seen following the burst of the
bubble can hold true today as well. Naganuma and Uno (2016) write that Japan’s long-term
unemployment, which remains high despite a decline in unemployment, can be attributed to
safety-nets. Specifically, in Japan long-term unemployment is most evident in the young adult
male population. Some of this can be attributed to the fact that there is a shift in labor market
demand away from manufacturing jobs, where most young adult men originally worked.
Furthermore, Japanese families often support their children until the children become employed.
It is not uncommon for young men and women to live with their families until they are
financially stable, or married, and this safety net that families provide for their children is
showing a similar effect on unemployment durations that unemployment insurance has in
European nations. Naganuma and Uno calls this the “freeze in hiring period” effect. Such longterm employment can result in discouraged workers, or those people participating in the gig
economy 3. Additionally, Japan’s extremely slow recovery from the bubble burst has impacted
discouraged worker rates. Japan’s economy has not yet shown a full economic recovery from the
burst in 1991. Such 30-year recovery from an economic shock suggests that Japan’s economy
may not return to such high economic growth, and that today’s economic state is the new normal.
Therefore, it must be debated whether the high numbers of discouraged workers that are being
seen today must be considered the new normal. If this is the case, it will be problematic that they
are not being taken into account through the unemployment rate measure.

Donovan (2016) and Friedman (2014) discuss the implication of the gig economy as well as how such work can
affect the labor markets by examining examples in the United States. Similar gig economies have been emerging in
Japan as well, implicating a similar economic effect.

3
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2.4 The New Phillips Curve
Some economists have suggested modifications to the Phillips curve, such as the
inclusion of additional variables. Ball and Moffitt (2001) are just two of the many authors that
have suggested additions or manipulations in the variables that are currently part of the Phillips
curve. They state that the trade-off between inflation and unemployment may no longer hold
today because of the significant rise in labor market productivity. The Phillips curve, they argue,
is shifting because of the lag in the change in worker wage aspiration relative to productivity
growth. Other economists such as Grubb et al. (1982) and Blinder (2000) have also observed the
mismatch between wage aspiration and productivity growth causing a shift in the Phillips curve.
They state that empirical evidence shows that the U.S. Phillips curve often includes this variable
already. Similar to Ball and Moffitt (2001), I will be observing the addition of variables or the
manipulation of variables in the Phillips curve.
For the purpose of this paper, I will be building on previous research by examining the
unemployment variable in Japan’s Phillips curve. Bregger and Haugen (1995) examine the
importance of the alternative measures of unemployment, U-1 through U-7, that were introduced
in 1994. The unemployment rate measure has been controversial for some time now. Strict
guidelines for categorizing those who are unemployed make many economists question whether
the unemployment rate encompasses all of those in the labor market who are unemployed and
want a job. Alternate unemployment rate measures often try to correct for this error. Specifically,
for the purpose of my paper, I will replicate Japan’s labor underutilization (LU) measure 4. When
examining the LU measures, they tell a very different story from simply looking at the

Such alternative measures have only been measured starting in January 2018, which is why this study will be
replicating the measure in order to be able to examine prior years.

4
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unemployment rate. For example, the LU4 measure includes unemployed workers,
underemployed workers, and discouraged workers, making it most similar to the U.S. U-6
measure. Within Japan’s alternative unemployment rate measures, the LU4 is the most
encompassing. In the first quarter of 2018, Japan’s unemployment rate was 2.6%, yet the LU4
measure was 5.9%. Japan’s large gap between unemployment rate and LU4 measure suggests
that there is a significant group of unemployed people who are not being captured by the
unemployment rate. In pointing out this large gap, the National Center of Educational Statistics
writes:
Japan also had very low unemployment rates in 1989. In fact, Japan had the lowest or
second lowest unemployment rates for all of the indicators. However, Japan's
unemployment rate that takes into account part-time workers and discouraged workers
(measure 7) was three times that of its conventional unemployment rate and over four
times that of the full-time unemployment rate (NCES).
If there is a structural error in the way unemployment is being measured, then it is highly likely
that the Phillips curve will no longer display the same relationship. Therefore, it is possible that
the Phillips curve’s relationship is in fact still relevant, but a flaw in the variable is causing the
relationship to seem unstable.
3. Data Methodology
3.1 Japan’s Unemployment Rate and Inflation Measures
Data for Japan’s labor market statistics come from the Statistical Bureau of Japan and the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications through monthly household surveys. The data I
acquired is aggregate unemployment, job searching, and labor force participation rate data. My
dataset covers all 47 prefectures of Japan from January 2002 to December 2019. Similar to other
industrial nations, Japan utilizes the International Labour Organization (ILO) standards to
determine employment and unemployment status. Prior to 2018, those considered in the labor
15

force were either considered employed or unemployed. Those who were considered employed
were then further broken down into those who have a job and worked at least one hour during
survey week and those who have a job but for whatever reason did not work during survey week.
Those not in the labor market were not further broken down into any categories. However,
starting in 2018, Japan changed the labor market breakdown and started to survey for involuntary
part time workers and discouraged workers. Within the dataset that I am working with, it is
important to note that there are data points from March through August of 2011 that are
predictions by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications because the Great East
Japan Earthquake prohibited the accurate collection survey results. Although for the purpose of
my study, it is more advantageous to collect actual data rather than predictions, this is an aspect
that I cannot control for.
Postwar Japan maintained an extremely low unemployment rate of roughly 1 to 2 percent
until the bubble burst in the early 1990s. Between the years of 2002 and 2019, Japan has had a
mean unemployment rate of 3.744 percent, with peaks in unemployment in August 2002 (5.8
percent) 5 and August 2009 (5.7 percent), as seen in figure 3. However, following the peak in
2009, which was caused by the Great Recession, the unemployment rate has steadily been
decreasing and in January 2018, was only 2.6 percent. 6 Compared to other industrial nations
such as the United States, Japan proves to have a slow unemployment recovery rate. Japan’s
struggle with long term unemployment could result in high levels of discouraged workers around
times of recession. However, some contrasting information regarding a decrease in discouraged

High levels of unemployment in the early 2000s resulted from a combination of the early 1990s bubble burst, the
Asian financial crisis of 1997, and the early 2000s dot-com recession.
6
Japan’s labor force categorization was redefined in 2018 in order to encompass the missing measures of
underutilized workers and discouraged workers. Due to this change that allowed for further breakdown, I will be
utilizing monthly data from January 2002 to December 2019 but stay consistent with my method in measuring
discouraged worker rather than utilizing LU measures for only 2018 and 2019.
5
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worker effect during recessions has also been documented by some economists 7. Figure 2
graphically outlines the general trend in Japan’s Unemployment Rates from 2002 to 2019.
Figure 2: General Trend in Japan’s Unemployment (2002-2019)

Since Japan did not provide their alternative labor force measures (Labor
Underutilization measures), as well as identify discouraged workers until January of 2018, I will
be predicting discouraged workers by examining the flow between ‘job searching’ and ‘not in the
labor force,’ a method that is also utilized in papers such as Kuroda (2002), Ohta and Teruyama
(2003), Sakura (2006), and Yamamoto (2008). To generate the discouraged worker variable, I
will create a proxy quotient, the flow between ‘job searching’ and ‘not in the labor force,’ as well

Yamamoto (2008) discusses how the persistence of married female workers during recessions in Japan causes a
decrease in discouraged worker effects. These women often only search for a job during a recession when the
family’s liquidity decreases.
7
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as a lag variable. By creating a lag variable, I am able to account for the information lag present
in the labor market. My discouraged worker proxy will therefore be calculated:
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 =

𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ 𝑡𝑡 − 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑡𝑡−1
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡

in which the 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑡𝑡 is the number of people searching for jobs at given month t and

𝐽𝐽𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑡𝑡−1 is the number of people looking for jobs at any given time with the time lag taken

into consideration.

For the inflation data, I will be utilizing Japan’s Consumer Price Index (CPI), also
collected by the Ministry of International Affairs and Communications. Between 2002 and 2019,
the CPI ranges from -2.5 to 3.7. Specifically, between 2002 and 2012, Japan mostly operated on
negative inflation rates as seen in the graph below. It is believed that the lack of monetary easing
on the part of the Bank of Japan caused such prolonged periods of deflation. Figure 3 outlines
these trends.
Figure 3: Trends in Japan’s Consumer Price Index (2002-2019)
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Japan’s CPI had remained negative early on. Recently, however, there are trends of positive
inflation, notably from 2013 onward.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of Japan’s labor statistics as well as their CPI
measure from 2002 through 2019. The table shows that I have 216 observations
(=12months*18years). It is important to note that my observations are listed per ten thousand
persons. The table also includes those statistics for the discouraged worker measures that I
calculated.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Japanese Labor Market: 2002 through 2019
(per ten thousand persons)

Table 1 shows the large range in CPI from 2002 through 2019. However, the labor statistics
seem to be pretty constant, as highlighted by the small numbers in the standard deviation.
Especially the number of those considered not to be in the labor force only have standard
deviation of 102.636 while the range only is 402 (= 4560 – 4158). The variance in CPI with little
changes in the labor statistics already suggests a flat Phillips curve, showing that the
unemployment rate is remaining relatively steady despite a volatile inflation measure. Here, it is
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also important to note that both the discouraged worker effect and the discouraged worker
measure only has 215 observations instead of 216 because of the elimination of the first
observation that happened due to the creation of the lag variable.
3.2 The Weintraub Equation
In order to theoretically analyze the Phillips curve throughout this paper, I will be
utilizing the Weintraub equation to understand the flattening of the Phillips curve in Japan. By
analyzing the Weintraub equation, I am able to understand the various factors within the
Japanese economy and labor force that are causing such a shift. In this case, the Weintraub
equation can indicate where there is a shift within the Japanese economy by examining inflation,
wages, and labor force productivity.
The Weintraub equation, developed in the 1970s by Sidney Weintraub, states that firms
determine prices based on wage growth, productivity growth, and the mark-up price, which is
held constant. He states that aggregate price level depends on the growth of money wages
relative to the growth of labor productivity. The Weintraub equation is described as:
𝑤𝑤

(1)

𝑃𝑃 = 𝑘𝑘( )
𝐴𝐴

where P is price, k is the mark-up, w is wage, and A is labor market productivity, also described
as

𝑁𝑁
𝑥𝑥

where N is total output and x is the total labor hours. In order to more easily understand the

relationship between the various variables, I rearrange the equation by taking the natural log on
either side of the equation:
(2)

ln(𝑃𝑃) = ln(𝑘𝑘) + ln(𝑤𝑤) − ln(𝐴𝐴)
∆𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃

(3)

= 𝑘𝑘 ° + 𝑤𝑤 ° − 𝐴𝐴°
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Equation 7 shows that inflation, or change in price over price, will increase if change in wages
are greater than changes in productivity if change in mark-up is constant. In the case of Japan,
labor markets have been tightening, which should signal greater change in wage, and subsequent
increase in inflation. On the contrary, we are seeing a decrease in unemployment and a decrease
in wage change, despite an increase in labor market productivity (Ip, 2018). Furthermore, Japan
has enough technological advancement, and as a result, labor market productivity is increasing
while prices remain at a minimum (Ip, 2018). This discrepancy suggests that the unemployment
rate does not capture structural changes in the labor markets 8. In fact, this shows the opposite
relation between unemployment and wage inflation that Phillips (1958) found. Therefore, when
examining the unemployment measure of Japan, we must question who is not being accounted
for within the measure. Furthermore, the Weintraub equation suggests another possibility—the
Japanese labor market is not as tight as the unemployment rate suggests upon first glance.
4 Results
4.1 Looking at Alternative Phillips Curves
Figure 4 shows the Phillips curve that was created using the unemployment data from
2002 to 2019 without taking into consideration discouraged workers. This figure is considered to
be the current Phillips curve of Japan.

Several structural changes within the Japanese labor force today could be responsible for this such as the
deterioration of the lifetime employment system as well as the emergence of gig economy and the guest worker
program which was introduced by the Abe administration.

8
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Figure 4: Japan’s Phillips Curve (2002-2019)

For the most part it is evident that the inverse relationship is somewhat maintained, although
there is a slight shift away from the trend around 4% of unemployment rate. However, the
Phillips curve evidently is extremely flat when compared to the Phillips curve that was presented
in Smith (2006) that used older data. The line of best fit for the Phillips curve is also shown on
the graph. The shaded region represents the region of points within the 95 percent confidence
interval. On the left, I present the Phillips curve with a linear fit, and on the right, the same graph
with a quadratic fit. With the quadratic fit model, there is an interesting finding of a concaved
Phillips curve rather than a convex one.
Figure 5 shows the alternative Phillips curve that was created utilizing the labor
underutilization measure, combining unemployment and discouraged workers.
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Figure 5: Japan’s Alternative Phillips Curve (2002-2019)

These Phillips curves with the alternative unemployment measure still shows a similar trend to
those in Figure 4. However, rather than at 4%, there is a slight deviation around 9%. Similar to
Figure 4, the line of best fit and the 95% confidence level region is also shown on the graph with
a linear fit on the left and a quadratic fit on the right. Compared to Figure 4, the points on the
graph are a lot more spread out, which could be explained by the wider range in the discouraged
worker measure throughout the years. Again, the quadratic fit shows a concaved Phillips curve
rather than a convex one.
In Figure 6, I have laid out the two Phillips curves on one graph. This way, the difference
in slopes between the two graphs is more easily evident and the two curves can easily be
compared. Those points in green are from the Phillips curve with the original unemployment
rate, and those points in red are representative of the Phillips curve utilizing the alternative
unemployment rate.
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Figure 6: Japan’s Phillips Curve and Alternative Phillips Curve (2002-2019)

As evident in the graph, the Phillips curve utilizing the alternative unemployment rate
demonstrates a much flatter slope than the original Phillips curve. Again, the left graph has the
linear fit and the right has the quadratic fit. When taking into consideration the discouraged
workers, the alternative Phillips curve has a flatter slope, and thus has less of a concaved shape.
However, with the original Phillips curve, the concaved shape is pronounced.
4.2 OLS Analysis
Once I create the two Phillips curves, I will use and OLS regression model to further
analyze the slopes of the two Phillips curves. My models utilize a quadratic fit despite recent
trends where the Phillips curve assumes linearity because in his original paper Phillips (1958)
concludes that “The relation between unemployment and the rate of change of wage rates is
therefore likely to be highly non-linear.” Furthermore, this belief is backed up by Phelps (1967)
who also concludes that such non-linearity is highly likely. My two models are as follows:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈2 𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡

where Unemp is the unemployment rate at given month t and 𝛼𝛼 is the constant. I square the

Unemp variable because the relationship between inflation and unemployment seems to be a
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(4)

quadratic fit. Similarly, for the Phillips curve using the alternative unemployment measure, I will
use the below model to estimate the coefficient:
(5)

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 2 𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡

where CPI is the inflation at given month t and Alt is the alternative unemployment at given
month t and 𝛼𝛼 is the constant. Table 2 below outlines the estimated coefficients from equation 4
that takes into consideration the original unemployment rate. Table 3 presents the estimated
coefficients from the equation 5 where the alternative unemployment rate is taken into
consideration.

Table 2: OLS Estimates of Original Phillips Curve
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Table 3: OLS Estimates of Alternative Phillips Curve

The effect of the concaved quadratic fit Phillips curve is evident from the negative coefficient in
the squared variables Unemployment2 and Alternative2, an observation that I did not expect at
the start of my study. The p-values show that the estimated coefficients are all statistically
significant. However, the R-squared value is low, suggesting that the Phillips curve’s
relationships is becoming weaker as other researchers suggest.
In order to understand the slope of quadratic fit of the Phillips curve, I take the first
derivative of equation 4 with respect to Unemp and the first derivative of equation 5 with respect
to Alt. By looking at the first derivative we can observe that for the slope we must calculate the
coefficient of 𝛽𝛽1 + 2𝛽𝛽2 . Therefore, for the original Phillips curve we note a slope of 1.677 (=

2.459 + 2* -0.391) and for the alternative Phillips curve, a slope of 0.655 (0.755 + 2* -0.050).
Therefore, the OLS regression model proves the flattening of the curve when taking into
consideration the discouraged worker that was evident graphically.
5 Theory and Discussion
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5.1 Theory: The Flatter Slope for the Alternative Unemployment Phillips Curve
The increased flattening of the Phillips curve when utilizing the alternative
unemployment measure can be explained by a couple of theories. First, when looking at analysis
around the 1990s bubble burst, such as Yamamoto (2008), trend in the labor market in Japan
showed low female labor market participation. Specifically, women often exit the labor market
once they get married and have children in order to focus on housework such as raising their
children. However, many of these women would re-enter the labor market during economic
booms. Pissarides (2000) 9 states that the equilibrium in job searching is dependent on the
business cycle, and therefore fluctuates with the labor market tightness. When their husbands’
income fell, and their families faced financial constraints during poor economic conditions, most
women felt the need to remain in the labor market or to re-enter if they already had not. Since
these women re-enter when considered absolutely necessary for the family, they often continue
to search for jobs past the equilibrium in the search model. As Yamamoto (2008) concludes, the
discouraged worker effect is dependent on the individual’s efficiency during the job searching
process throughout the business cycle. Therefore, a decline in the discouraged worker effect in
Japan can be explained by married women remaining in the labor market, due to reasons such as
their husband’s income falling or financial constraints faced by the family, despite there being a
decline in the efficiency in job searching. However, marriage rates in Japan have continued to
fall, and those who are unmarried by the age of 50 have quadrupled for men and doubled for
women 10. Additionally, fertility rates in Japan have fallen to 1.43 in 2013 11, and the elimination

Pissarides (2000) states that during economic recessions, an individual’s job search intensity endogenously
decreases, and therefore is able to achieve an efficient level of job searching.
10
Marriage statistics are gathered by the Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare
11
Data provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication, Statistics Bureau
9
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of the lifetime employment, coupled with the decrease in the husband’s income lead to an
increase in female labor market participation.
Higuchi and Abe (1999) as well as Kuroda and Yamamoto (2007) point out this “added
worker effect” where the wife is more likely to enter the labor force due to lack of income
revenue from the husband alone. If we consider the discouraged worker effect in Japan to be
largely controlled by married females, as Kuroda and Yamamoto (2007) observe, we can
insinuate that later marriages or no marriages by Japanese women result in a decrease in the
discouraged worker effect in Japan. Since Japan’s marriage rates are falling, and the average age
at marriage is increasing, we can conclude that the discouraged worker effect driven by women
is declining, causing a rise in real friction in the labor market, which leads to a flattening of the
Phillips curve (Yamamoto, 2008).
5.1.2 Theory: The Concaved Phillips Curve
Although it is unclear exactly why the Japanese Phillips curve is concaved rather than
convex, some theories could be used as an explanation as well as be explored in future research.
I hypothesize that there is some sort of threshold effect that is causing the Phillips curve to
behave this way. Ho and Iyke (2018) build on previous research that suggests the possibility of a
threshold effect on the Phillips curve by examining 11 eurozone countries from January 1999 to
February 2017 by examining where the threshold is that the Phillips curve relationship switches
from a negative one to a positive one. Their findings show that between 5.00% and 6.54% of
unemployment lies a threshold where the relationship between inflation and unemployment
switches to a positive one. Furthermore, they find that past this threshold, the relationship
between the two variables no longer hold true. While Ho and Iyke (2018) focus on European
countries, it is possible that Japan’s Phillips curve is contingent upon a certain threshold of
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unemployment. Although it is possible that some sort of cultural aspect is impacting Japan’s
backwards bending Phillips curve, it is also possible that the stubborn low inflation rates that
have been observed in both Japan and various European nations somehow are impacting the
Phillips curve slope as well. Regardless, in order to have a definitive answer, further research
will be necessary.
5.2 Limitation and Future Studies
Although my study was able to contribute to the literature surrounding the flattening of
the Phillips curve, it is necessary to mention some limitations within the study. First, my analysis
of Japan’s Phillips curve is limited in observation points due to the lack of information collected
on the part of Japan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Data on discouraged
worker was not collected until January 2018, which resulted in having to create a proxy to
calculate the discouraged worker effect of the previous months. Since this proxy was created by
examining the flow from ‘job searching’ to ‘not in the labor force,’ it is inevitable that there will
be some error in the values I calculated for the number of discouraged workers. When looking at
my calculations for 2018 alternative unemployment measure, and the LU3 measure 12, we find a
3.1 percent discrepancy (= 6.3 - 3.2). Furthermore, the job searching data that I was provided
with from the Japan Statistics Bureau began in 2002, which limited the number of years that I
could examine. However, in future research, there will be more data points available for
alternative unemployment measures starting in 2018 that will allow for more accurate analysis.
Analysis of this dataset could also have some limitations because of the number of recessions
accounted for within the short period of time. In the early 2000s, Japan was still suffering from

The LU3 measure of Japan looks at unemployment rate and discouraged workers. (= (unemployed + discouraged
worker) / (labor force + discouraged worker population)*100)
12
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the Asian Financial Crisis as well as the dot com recession, and in 2008 the Great Recession also
had a large impact on unemployment data. Furthermore, the Tōhoku earthquake of 2011 also
could be counted as an exogenous variable that I did not properly account for in my analysis.
However, in order to fully understand how recessions and negative shocks in the economy affect
Japan’s discouraged worker rates, there should be research conducted on the modern-day labor
market regarding this topic.
In the future, it could be beneficial to utilize a wider range of alternative unemployment
measures that are covered by Japan’s labor underutilization statistics. For example, the LU4
takes into consideration underutilized workers such as those who are involuntary part time
workers in addition to discouraged workers. Examining the effects of creating a more
encompassing unemployment measure could be more effective when there are more data points
that have been collected and published in the future. Furthermore, in the future there will be
enough data points to conduct such research with the data points that the Japanese Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Communications provided.
Another extension of this paper would be to further examine the concaved Phillips curve
of Japan. As mentioned above, although it is possible that there is some threshold effect present
that is causing such a shift, but further research will be necessary to fully understand the reasons
behind this phenomenon.
5.3 Policy Implication
The Flatter Phillips Curve and Central Banks
The validity of the Phillips curve is important for those who utilize the relationship in
order to apply fiscal and monetary policy, specifically those in central banks. The flatter Phillips
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curve alone suggests that economic activity and the tightness of the economy may not have as
large of an effect on inflation as originally believed. This could largely impact central bank
responses to unemployment rates in order to stabilize inflation rates. Economists in the United
States such as Ben Bernanke and Janet Yellen have also suggested less harsh responses to
changes in interest rates as a response to changes in unemployment in order to stabilize inflation
rates. Specifically, for Japan, the Phillips curve has been important in fighting the chronic
deflation that has been present for decades. If the relationship no longer holds true, or if there is
not a strong enough relation between the two variables for central bankers, it is important that
changes are made in order to have more effective policies put in place.
Measuring Economic Statistics: Unemployment and Inflation
My results highlight the large discrepancies between the actual unemployment rate and
the alternative unemployment rates in Japan. Large gaps between unemployment rates and
alternative unemployment rates suggests that there is an issue in our definition of unemployment.
Furthermore, the finding suggests that changes in labor market are requiring this reexamination
to happen. Specifically, the emergence of the gig economy questions how we will be
categorizing those who are working independently when necessary, but do not work during the
survey week.
6. Conclusion
This paper investigated Japan’s flattening out of the Phillips curve, and intends to answer
the question: Does an unemployment measure that is more encompassing revalidate the Japanese
Phillips curve? In order to answer my questions, I gathered labor market data from the Japanese
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications from 2002 through 2019. My study is the first
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to address the validity of methodology of the gathering of such data and its role in the flattening
of the Phillips curve. In total, my data set contained 215 observations, which covered the labor
market statistics for all 47 prefectures in Japan from 2002 to 2019. My results showed two
significant findings. First, the Phillips curve that took into consideration the alternative
unemployment rate had a flatter slope than the original Phillips curve. Specifically, the slope for
the original Phillips curve is 1.677 and the alternative Phillips curve was 0.655. This
phenomenon can most likely be explained by unique changes happening amongst the Japanese
female population such as lower marriage rates, later marriage ages, or lower fertility rates.
Second, the Japanese Phillips curve shows a concaved curve rather than a convex curve.
Although I suggest some possible theories behind this phenomenon, further research is necessary
to understand why Japan’s Phillips curve is exhibiting such behavior.
Although my finding showed a difference in the Phillips curve slope with and without the
alternative unemployment rate for Japan, whether my findings are externally valid is
questionable. When examining Japan’s labor market as a whole, there are several factors that
make it unique from other nations. First, Japan’s geographic location allows for less interference,
and less possibility of illegal or foreign workers. Since the country is surrounded by water on all
sides, it is difficult for foreign labor to enter the Japanese market. Furthermore, the Japanese
government had controlled foreign labor to be at a minimum until a recent guest worker program
was proposed by the current prime minister’s administration. Tighter borders and isolation lead
to fewer illegal immigrants, which allows for a clearer case to analyze the Japanese labor market.
However, in countries where borders allow foreign workers to enter the country, our findings
may not be applicable.
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Second, although Japan is an industrial nation similar to other countries that are
experiencing a flatter Phillips curve, whether gender trends in the labor market across these
countries are the same is questionable. In recent years, Japan has experienced large shifts in the
labor market that are not only an effect of an increase in female labor due to a decrease in
marriage rates and fertility rates. Japan’s labor market also is currently suffering from an extreme
aging population. Currently, Japan’s population is the oldest in the world, with roughly 28
percent of the country being 65 years old or older. This, coupled with low fertility rates, creates a
unique shift in Japan’s demographic compared to other developed nations around the world.
However, some other industrial nations in the world, such as Germany and Italy have displayed
similar trends, which could possibly allow for my results to be externally valid.
Lastly, the security the young men have in Japan may be a cultural factor that is unique to
the country. Being able to live with their families until employment or marriage gives these
young men the luxury of taking their time to find employment. This may also lead to higher
discouraged workers in Japan compared to other countries because young potential workers can
be more sensitive to wages within the labor market.
Based on my findings, future researchers can investigate why the Japanese Phillips curve
is shaped to be concaved rather than the traditional convex shape. Future studies can also
examine various implications for the Japanese economy that result from such a Phillips curve.
Future studies should also utilize data that is more accurately collected from the Japanese
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications rather than utilizing a proxy to measure
discouraged workers. However, in order to have ample data points, this will be needed to be
conducted several years from now. However, ultimately my research questions whether we can
rely so heavily on the Phillips curve for fiscal and monetary policy. My findings show a very flat
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slope, and thus little relation between inflation and unemployment, for both Phillips curves that I
generated. Yet, many economists and politicians rely on this balance to reason their policy
decisions.
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